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Abstract
General equilibrium is the dominant theoretical framework for economic policy analysis at the level
of the whole economy. In practice, general equilibrium treats economies as being always in equilibrium,
albeit in a sequence of equilibria as driven by external changes in parameters. This view is sometimes
defended on the grounds that internal dynamics are fast, while external changes are slow, so that the
economy can be viewed as adjusting instantaneously to any changed conditions. However, the argument
has not been presented in a rigorous way. In this paper we show that when conditions are such that: a)
economies do respond essentially instantaneously to external influences; b) the external changes are small
compared to the values that characterize the economy; and c) the economy’s dynamics are continuous
and first-order in time (as for Walrasian taˆtonnement), the resulting economic theory is equivalent to
a topological field theory. Because it is a topological theory it has no dynamics in a strict sense, and
so perturbatively—that is, when examining dynamics in the region of a critical point—the field theory
behaves as general equilibrium posits. However, the field-theoretic form of the theory admits non-
perturbative instanton solutions that link different critical points. Thus, in this theory, and in contrast
to general equilibrium, the internal dynamics of the model occasionally make an appearance in the form
of abrupt, noise-driven transitions between critical points.
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1 Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are the de facto standard for economy-wide economic policy
analysis. Despite their popularity, the theoretical foundation for general equilibrium is remarkably thin
(Ackerman, 2001; Kirman, 1989). Theoretical support emerged in the search for “microfoundations” of
macroeconomics carried out throughout much of the last century (Janssen, 1993). That search ended in
disappointment—the theory could not guarantee stability, so practitioners focused on finding equilibria, or
critical points, regardless of stability (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 2002). The result is, in practice, equilibrium
models with no dynamics that can take the system to equilibrium; instead, “dynamics” are provided by
sequential equilibria that result from external changes—”shocks” to the system.1 These are represented in
the model as exogenous changes in parameters, and so we refer to this as “parametric” dynamics.
In many presentations of general equilibrium the problem of how the equilibrium is reached—which
we refer to as “internal” dynamics—is simply not addressed (Fisher, 1983; Kirman, 2006). Indeed, some
presentations of general equilibrium argue that it is incorrect to think of an equilibrium as having been
reached through some dynamic process (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 2002). We agree with Fisher (1983) that
it is meaningless to talk about equilibrium without some notion of disequilibrium dynamics, and consider
instead the justification sometimes offered in defense of general equilibrium that markets adjust rapidly
enough to changed conditions that internal dynamics can be ignored compared to slow external changes.
[E.g., see Tobin (1993), on the neoclassical assumption that markets clear instantaneously, a position he
1The somewhat misleadingly-named theory of dynamic general equilibrium describes the sequence of equilibria that results
from agents who optimize the use of their resources over some time horizon (Heer and Mauner, 2009).
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rejects.] In this paper we present a formal statement of this informal argument to assess whether it provides
a justification for general equilibrium. Drawing on recent work by Ovchinnikov (2011, 2012), we argue that
when an economy can be considered as adjusting rapidly to slow, low amplitude noise, and the adjustment
mechanism is first-order in time, it can be represented as a topological field theory. Under these conditions the
theory behaves perturbatively as general equilibrium expects it to—it is a topological theory and there are,
in a strong sense, no dynamics. However, the field theory also has non-perturbative instanton solutions that
can move the system abruptly from one critical point to another. This can occur even without parametric
dynamics—it occurs purely because of the internal dynamics in the presence of noise.
Because there is no dynamics in the topological theory, we drop the term “equilibrium” that is used in
economics to refer to stationary solutions to the noise-free dynamics; instead, we refer to them as critical
points. Instanton-mediated transitions occur only between critical points that can be reached “classically”,
in a sense that we clarify later in this paper. However, Ovchinnikov’s theory implies, in the context of general
equilibrium, that this will only happen when there are asymmetries in the response of prices or quantities
of one set of goods with respect to another set of goods. Otherwise, a version of Anderson localization will
keep the system at the critical point. In other words, the neglect, in general equilibrium, of the stability of
equilibria may be justified in the limited case when an economy is driven by slow, low-amplitude noise, but
not if there are asymmetric responses to changes in one set of goods compared to other goods; in this case,
there will be occasional transitions from one critical point to another, mediated by instantons.
2 Deterministic Theory
To keep close to the theory of general equilibrium, we assume that quantities are fixed, and only prices
can adjust, although this assumption is not essential for the theory presented in this paper. Adjustment
is first order in prices, corresponding to a Walrasian adjustment process.2 We define a vector of prices p,
whose elements p1, p2, . . . , pn are the prices of the n goods that the economy produces. Prices adjust in the
direction of excess demand A(p, pi) (the difference between demand and supply at the specified price), where
pi is a vector of m parameters and A is a vector-valued function, with an element for each of the n goods
in the economy. This dynamic implies that when demand exceeds supply the price rises, and when supply
exceeds demand the price falls.3 That is,
dp
dt
= A(p, pi). (1)
Such dynamics do not guarantee stability in discrete time, even when the corresponding continuous-time
model is stable (Saari, 1985), and it can be argued that economic processes necessarily take place in discrete
time. However, the instabilities arise in models in which all prices are changed simultaneously and publicly.
This is an unrealistic representation of real markets. Gintis (2007) provides a more realistic model in which
prices are private, and, in an agent-based implementation of the model, finds that the system exhibits global
convergence with local fluctuations. We proceed on the assumption that the continuous-time model is a
good approximation to the actual process of adjustment in an economy, but is accompanied by “noise” that
represents the difference between the approximation and the reality.
2.1 Parametric dynamics
A typical general equilibrium policy analysis first sets dp/dt to zero in Equation (1) in both a “no policy”
and a “policy” case; next, the critical points of A(p, pi) are found for fixed pi, and the results compared. The
policy is represented by setting one element of the parameter vector, e.g., pi1, equal to two separate values,
pi1 (the no-policy value) and pi
′
1 (the policy value), where the path from pi1 to pi
′
1 is not specified.
4
2Walras himself did not present his theory as a dynamic equation; this formulation was proposed by Samuelson (1947). Also,
we point out that adjustment mechanisms have been proposed that do not assume a taˆtonnement process (Fisher, 1983), that
include both prices and quantities (Flaschel et al., 1997), and that are second-order in time (Kemp-Benedict, 2012).
3Walras proposed that an “auctioneer” announces a public price, after which producers and consumers announce the quan-
tities that they propose to sell or buy (Walras, 1954). This is clearly unrealistic, and critics of general equilibrium often point
to this flaw in the theory, asking who sets prices. In this paper we are not concerned with how prices are set, and accept the
dynamic equation at face value.
4Although we do not consider path-dependence of parametric variables in this paper, we note the problems that arise if
multiple critical points appear after the introduction of the policy, as the standard method gives no way to choose between
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2.2 Classical paths
From this point forward we focus on non-parametric dynamics, and so we suppress the parameter vector pi
in subsequent equations. We note that Equation (1) is in a “classical” form, in that there is no noise. In
contrast, later in this paper we discuss the case with noise, which is analogous to a quantum field theory.
We therefore use “classical” in the sense that it is used in physics, rather than economics—the model we
describe is a neo-classical economic model.
The excess demand function A(p) is a vector-valued function. We assume that it is smooth,5 and from
the Helmholtz-Hodge theorem we can write it as the sum of the negative gradient of a scalar potential V (p)
and a divergence-free term A¯(p), so that
dp
dt
= −∇V (p) + A¯(p). (2)
We dot-multiply both sides of this equation by dp/dt and integrate over time, to find
∫ tf
t0
dt
∣∣∣∣dpdt
∣∣∣∣
2
= V (p(t0))− V (p(tf )) +
∫
pcl
dp · A¯, (3)
where pcl is the classical path between p(t0) and p(tf ). Because the integrand on the left-hand side of this
equation is always positive, the right-hand side must also be positive. We therefore find, for classical paths,
the condition
V (p(tf )) ≤ V (p(t0)) +
∫
pcl
dp · A¯. (4)
This positivity condition continues to hold true in the presence of noise, but the “classical” path pcl will be
a tunneling path in that noise can assist it over a classical barrier, so that prices appear to tunnel through
the barrier. We note that the path-dependent integral over A¯(p) means that the classical accessibility of a
critical point depends on the path taken to reach it. However, this is not a serious issue for the classical
theory, as our interest with this formula is whether the final price vector can be reached from the initial
point; all that matters is that there is some path pcl satisfying Equation (4). Also, the path-dependent term
in the positivity condition makes sense: it makes a path more favorable when it is positive, which will be
true if the direction of change of a price along a path is in the same direction as the spontaneous change
that would occur if the excess demand were A¯. We illustrate the reasonableness of the condition through an
example in Appendix A. In contrast to the classical case, the path-dependency of the second term matters a
great deal for the field theory, where it determines whether the system remains localized at its critical points
or undergoes a transition.
3 Field Theory
The “classical” theory presented in the previous section is deterministic, but in real economies we expect
some deviation from the theoretical ideal. First, some prices may be influenced by external variations over
which the market has no direct control (e.g., changing food prices from fluctuating crop yields or price
movements on the international market). Second, the theoretical ideal requires all market actors to know
the current actual state of excess demand and to respond appropriately; more realistically, market actors
have to guess on the basis of incomplete information. Either of these situations can be represented in the
model by introducing a noise vector ξ with one entry for each good,
dp
dt
−A(p) = ξ. (5)
them. Common experience suggests that responses to a new economic policy depend on the path taken for the implementation.
For example, an explanation of economic reforms in India by the Deputy Director of the Reserve Bank of India (Mohan, 2006)
emphasized phased implementation of new policies. If the path does not matter for the outcome then it is difficult to see why
the government would expend the effort on a phased implementation.
5This assumption is common, but questionable. We can expect continuity (Kirman, 1989), but not necessarily smoothness.
Ovchinnikov (2012) discusses the case where A(p) is non-differentiable, in particular if its is a fractal strange attractor.
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We further assume that changes in the noise fields are slow compared to the characteristic adjustment time
of the price dynamics and also that the system provides no feedback to the noise fields (otherwise, they
would be part of the system). The time scale separation between the noise and prices is what allows us to
continue to write the excess demand as an instantaneous function of p (that is, with no memory of earlier
values of p). We recognize that this may be a questionable assumption in real economies. For example,
manufacturers set prices infrequently, and based on criteria other than an assessment of the gap between
current supply and estimated demand (Blinder, 1994, 1998), while retailers may change prices more frequently
than manufacturers, but using a variety of heuristic strategies (Bolton and Shankar, 2003). Also, government
policies can influence price dynamics, as well as price levels. In a study of the reliability of a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model with an agricultural sector, the model was found to over-predict price
volatility in importing countries; the authors proposed that government policies reduced the transmission
of volatility from international to domestic markets (Valenzuela et al., 2007). However, in this paper we
are concerned with a common justification for the assumptions of general equilibrium theory—that market
adjustment processes (deterministic dynamics) are fast compared to the characteristic time of changes in
exogenous factors (noise). We ask whether this assumption, if true, supports the conclusion that markets
always stay close to the critical points of the excess demand function. For now, we note that the assumption
may be false, and return to this point at the end of the paper.
The system described by Equation (5) was discussed by Ovchinnikov (2011, 2012). We present a simplified
(and somewhat heuristic) derivation of the central result that the model described by Equation (5) can be
expressed as a topological field theory. From this point forward we will refer to the price and noise vectors
as “fields”, although we assume (with general equilibrium theory) that there is no spatial dependence.
The only stochastic elements in the model are in the noise, so the only statistical partition function
we can construct is the one for the noise fields. We assume that the noise is Gaussian white noise with a
noise-noise correlator Gij ,
〈ξi(t)ξj(t
′)〉 = Gijδ(t− t
′). (6)
With this assumption, the partition function Z is
Z =
∫
Dξ e−
1
2
∫
T
0
dt ξ·G·ξ. (7)
This partition function contains very little information and no dynamics, because the noise fields have a
simple, and static, Gaussian structure. In the context of a path integral, however, Equation (5) allows us to
change variables from the noise fields ξ to the price fields p. In general the mapping will be one-to-many,
which has interesting implications for the behavior of the system. We write Equation (7) as
Z =
∫
Dp
∣∣∣∣∂ξ∂p
∣∣∣∣ e− 12
∫
T
0
dtK·G·K , (8)
where
K =
dp
dt
−A (9)
and |∂ξ/∂p| is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix J , with elements
Jij = δij
d
dt
−
∂Ai
∂pj
. (10)
Using the standard technique of Faddeev-Popov ghosts, the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as the integral
of the exponential of the Jacobian, bracketed by two vectors of Grassman variables η and η¯,
∣∣∣∣ ∂ξ∂ϕ
∣∣∣∣ = detJ (11a)
=
∫
DηDη¯ e
∫
T
0
dt η¯Jη (11b)
=
∫
DηDη¯ e
∫
T
0
dt (η¯·dη/dt−η¯·∇A·η), (11c)
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where [∇A]ij = ∂Ai/∂pj. It is also convenient to re-express the integral over p with the help of an additional
bosonic field B, as
e−
∫
T
0
dtK·G·K =M−1
∫
DB e−i
∫
T
0
dtB·(K− 12 iG
−1
·B), (12)
where M is the Gaussian integral
∫
DB exp(−B · G−1 · B). The equivalence can be checked formally by
redefining Bi as B¯i − i
∑
j GijKj and integrating over the B¯i (for fixed pi). Putting all the pieces together,
and ignoring the unimportant factor M−1, the partition function becomes
Z =
∫
DpDBDηDη¯ e−S, (13)
where S =
∫ T
0 dt L and the Lagrangian L is
L = iB ·
(
dp
dt
−A−
1
2
iG−1B
)
− η¯ ·
(
dη
dt
−∇A · η
)
. (14)
The topological nature of the theory emerges when we realize that the action can be generated from the
(nilpotent) BRST operator
Q =
∫ T
0
dt
(
η ·
δ
δp
+ iB ·
δ
δη¯
)
. (15)
The action S can be expressed as
S = {Q,Ψ}, (16)
where
Ψ =
∫ T
0
dt η¯ ·
(
K −
1
2
iG−1B
)
. (17)
The action therefore consists solely of the BRST gauge-fixing term. This is consistent with the non-dynamical
partition function in Equation (7)—there were no dynamics in the beginning and therefore none at the end
of the change of variables from ξ to p. However, the nontrivial Jacobian that relates the variables allows
topologically distinct regions of the space that the fields inhabit.
3.1 Localization and instantons
The symmetry under theQ operator (Q-symmetry) is responsible for the lack of dynamics in the perturbative
field theory. As shown by Ovchinnikov (2011), when the noise is low-amplitude (|Gij | ≪ 1) and the Q-
symmetry is unbroken, the partition function does not depend on the time T . At the one-loop level the
partition function is a topological invariant, and as the ground state isQ-invariant, higher-order perturbations
will likewise be invariant. While the price field (with the conjugate bosonic field B) does, indeed, vary due
to the noise (Ovchinnikov, 2012), the variation is exactly compensated by fluctuations of the fermionic ghost
fields, and the system is localized near the critical points of A(p).
The Q-symmetry is never broken if the excess demand function can be written purely as the gradient of
a potential, so that A¯(p) in Equation (2) is zero. Detailed arguments for this important claim are provided
by Ovchinnikov (2011, 2012), but we motivate it with a heuristic argument. Non-perturbatively, the field
theory admits instanton solutions that link ground states. When the noise is very weak—as we assume
in this theory—paths exceeding the barrier are strongly suppressed. However, if they are accompanied by
anti-instantons that traverse the reverse path, then the barrier is effectively lowered (Levy, 2000). As a
consequence, in the low-noise case instantons are always associated with anti-instantons. In the theory
presented in this paper, the instanton is a sequence of price changes leading from one critical point to
another; the anti-instanton traverses the reverse sequence of price changes. If there are symmetrical price
responses (so that ∇A is a symmetric matrix near the initial critical point), then the anti-instanton cancels
the instanton, and the system is highly likely to remain at the initial critical point (Ovchinnikov, 2011, 2012).
When the symmetry is unbroken, the fields change only because of the noise. The noise has no memory,
and it drives the time-rate of change of the price field in Equation (5), so changes in the price field are
Markovian. When A = 0 and the noise is Gaussian, this corresponds to Brownian motion. When A 6= 0 and
the amplitude of the noise is small, prices execute a random walk in the neighborhood of metastable critical
points.
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3.2 Symmetry breaking and instanton-mediated transitions
If the price response is not symmetric, so that A¯(p) 6= 0, then the contribution of the instanton and the
anti-instanton to the action are different. The difference arises from the path-dependency of the integral over
A¯(p)—the contribution of the reverse path (the anti-instanton) is not the same as that of the forward path
(the instanton). Because the instanton and anti-instanton are imbalanced, the system is not localized at the
critical point, and the system can transition from one critical point to another. In fact, it must transition
through a path that joins critical points of different index (where the index of a critical point is the number of
negative eigenvalues). The index of the critical point is its “topological charge”, and the transition between
topologically distinct states breaks the Q-symmetry. Thus, to go from one stable point to another—that
is, states with an index of zero—the system must pass through an unstable or saddle point (Ovchinnikov,
2011).
This result implies that when there are asymmetric responses of the price of one good to changes in
the price of another good, then the economy can, under the influence of slow and low-amplitude noise,
occasionally and abruptly transition from one critical point to another. The transition is not deterministic,
as it depends on the noise, so the timing of the transition cannot be known. However, the possibility for
a transition can be known, if the shape of the excess demand function is known: a transition can occur
whenever there is asymmetry in the way prices of goods respond to one another, and the inequality (4) is
satisfied.
4 Implications for CGE theory
Reviewing the arguments made by CGE proponents for their practices, we find that in the case where the
system’s dynamics are fast compared to the slow, low-amplitude noise, two of those arguments seem to be
at least partly valid:
1. there are no dynamics in the theory (beyond instanton-mediated transitions),
2. the system can live at an metastable critical point (but only if the excess demand function can be
expressed as the negative gradient of a scalar potential).
However, there is no reason to think that the excess demand function will have the second property, and so
we add a further point,
3. if there are asymmetries in the way that quantities or prices of some goods respond to changes in
quantities or prices of other goods, then the system will rarely but occasionally transition from one
critical point to another.
It is important to recognize that the assumption of slow and low-amplitude noise is often not realistic.
For example, a small, open, agricultural economy will be strongly influenced by international prices for the
commodities that it produces. Those commodity prices can vary considerably during a growing season, so
that by the time the “system” (composed of, e.g., farmers and a commodity board) is able to respond,
the “noise” (international commodity prices) may have changed many times and with a large amplitude.
Therefore this partial justification for general equilibrium theory should be interpreted with caution. It is
only relevant when an economy is subject to slow and low-amplitude fluctuations. Moreover, the validity of
the assumption depends on the critical points being locally stable against small perturbations, and current
economic theory cannot say what economic conditions produce stable critical points.
These (important) cautions aside, if an economy is well-described by the theory presented in this paper,
then it can still undergo quite dramatic and rapid shifts. But these shifts are the instanton-mediated
transitions from one critical point to another; after the transition the system is once again characterized by
fast dynamics and slow, low-amplitude noise.
5 Conclusion
The practice of computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling dominates in economy-wide policy analysis,
yet its theoretical foundation is weak. We have argued that partial support for the theory of general
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equilibrium comes from a surprising direction—quantum field theory. The connection was elucidated in a
general way by Ovchinnikov (2012), while the present paper applies his theory to macroeconomics. The
implications of the theory are that, if the assumption that an economy can be split into two parts—a
complex dynamic part that responds very quickly to a slow, low-amplitude part that can be regarded as
stochastic noise—then the economy can feature abrupt transitions. It will spend most of its time at a single
critical point, but if there are asymmetric responses to changes in prices of different goods, then the system
will occasionally transition from one critical point to another. Because instantons are non-perturbative
phenomena, they do not emerge in perturbative macroeconomic models.
In this paper we have followed standard general equilibrium theory and assumed no spatial dependence.
In the standard theory of general equilibrium this is justified by labeling commodities by their location and
time, so that a sack of kidney beans in Paris, Texas today is a completely different commodity than a sack
of kidney beans in Paris, France tomorrow (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 2002). This may be reasonable when
considering each of the markets independently, but not as a whole—the global collection of local markets in
kidney beans is the global market in kidney beans. This suggests that a spatially explicit representation of
interconnected markets (perhaps as a network) could reveal some interesting dynamics. Indeed, Ovchinnikov
(2011, 2012) points out that a spatial theory with a large number of critical points can exhibit self-organized
criticality. Such behavior could, for example, help to explain the scale-independent behavior of financial
markets seen by Preis et al. (2011).
The theory presented in this paper gives a picture of an economy that is partly in agreement with those
who defend the theory of general equilibrium, but partly at odds with it. Unlike the general equilibrium
view, in which the economy can only change through the influence of a secular external change (a “shock”),
in the view proposed in the present paper the economy can change due to its own internal logic, through a
spontaneous transition under the influence of slowly varying, low-amplitude noise.
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A Multiple Equilibria and Path-Dependency
In this appendix we show how, in an example, the path-dependent term that appears in the positivity
condition in Equation (4) favors an economically sensible path. For our example we define an excess demand
function that has two interesting features: multiple equilibria and asymmetric responses between different
prices. We construct it in the following way. First, we define
dp1
dt
= −
∂
∂p1
V (p1, p2) + k(p2 − p
∗
2), (18a)
dp2
dt
= −
∂
∂p2
V (p1, p2)− k(p1 − p
∗
1). (18b)
The terms multiplied by k are asymmetrical, and lead to path dependency. In this equation, (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a
reference point for the prices, allowing us to work with the deviations (∆p1,∆p2), where
pi = p
∗
i +∆pi, i = 1, 2. (19)
We construct a symmetric double-well potential with two minima at the same level. The general form for
the potential is
V (p1, p2) = V (p
∗
1 +∆p1, p
∗
2 +∆p2) =
1
4
(
a2 −∆p21
)2
+
1
2
b∆p22. (20)
A specific example, for a = 1, b = 1, is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Symmetric double well potential
With this potential we have
d∆p1
dt
= ∆p1
(
a2 −∆p21
)
+ k∆p2, (21a)
d∆p2
dt
= −b∆p2 − k∆p1. (21b)
We now tell a story about this system to motivate its dynamics. Considering only the terms multiplied by k,
assume that Good 1 is a manufactured item that requires Good 2 for its manufacture. If the price of Good 2
goes up, then manufacturers of Good 1 eventually raise their prices to compensate, so the coefficient of the
price of Good 2 in Equation (21a) is positive. In contrast, if the price of Good 1 goes up, then fewer people
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buy Good 1 and therefore demand for Good 2 (the input) goes down. This leads to a fall in its price, so the
coefficient of the price of Good 1 in Equation (21b) is negative. Good 2 has a standard own-price response
that restores the system to equilibrium: if sellers put the price up, then demand falls and they respond by
lowering the price again. For Good 1, the own-price response is more complicated. In the vicinity of the two
minima, the system exhibits a standard own-price response of restoring the price to its equilibrium location.
However, there are two possible minima, one at a lower price than the other. We suppose in this case that
there are two markets that manufacturers can potentially sell into: a larger but low-spending group looking
for a bargain and a smaller but high-spending group that values uniqueness—they will pay a premium for
goods that few people have.6 If manufacturers are, for example, producing for the low-spending group, then
they find it hard to move away from that stable point, because they cannot raise prices too much for the
low-spending group, but cannot induce the high-spending group to buy.
Setting the time-derivatives of ∆p1 and ∆p2 to zero shows the conditions for the two wells to be
∆p1 = ±
√
a2 −
k2
b
, (22a)
∆p2 = −
k
b
∆p1. (22b)
So there are two stable equilibrium points, (∆pb1,∆p
b
2) and (∆p
a
1 ,∆p
a
2), as shown in Figure 2.
We now suppose that the system passes from (∆pb1,∆p
b
2) to (∆p
a
1 ,∆p
a
2), following one of two paths, as
shown in Figure 2. In Path A, the price of Good 2 first falls, and then the price of Good 1 increases. In
Path B, the price of Good 1 increases, and then the price of Good 2 falls. For Path A,
∫
A
dp · A¯ = −k∆pb1
(
∆pa2 −∆p
b
2
)
+ k∆pa2
(
∆pa1 −∆p
b
1
)
< 0, (23)
while for Path B, ∫
A
dp · A¯ = k∆pb2
(
∆pa1 −∆p
b
1
)
− k∆pb1
(
∆pa2 −∆p
b
2
)
> 0. (24)
Examining Equation (4), we see that the path that gives a positive value for this integral is favored. Therefore,
Path B is favored over Path A. This is reasonable, because, for Path B to come about, manufacturers switch
to the higher price that drives the bulk of consumers away but that attracts a small cliente`le that is willing
to pay for uniqueness. However, if the amount of the input, Good 2, per unit of output, Good 1, remains
the same, then demand for Good 2 is lower and the price falls. That is, Path B has a sensible story, given
the assumptions about consumer behavior. In contrast, Path A does not. For Path A to come about, first
the price of Good 2 falls (for example, because new reserves are discovered, new producers enter the market,
or other consumption of the good falls), and then manufacturers of Good 1 decide that it is a good time to
move from the lower-paying to the higher-paying group of customers. They might decide to do so, but not
because of the drop in the price of Good 2, which would otherwise give them a windfall profit while the drop
persisted.
While this is a simple example, it illustrates the point that the the positivity condition in Equation (4)
selects for economically reasonable paths. It does this because it favors paths where the changes are in
the direction that would occur spontaneously if the excess demand function were given by its non-potential
component A¯. If A¯ itself is reasonable, in that it reflects a sensible causal story about the relationship
between goods, then the favorable path will likewise reflect a sensible causal story.
6Standard consumption theory claims to not question people’s preferences, and instead discovers them through their con-
sumption behavior. We could therefore make almost any story we like to motivate this example; indeed, almost any continuous
function can be represented as the sum of well-behaved individual demand functions (Kirman, 1989), so we do not need any
motivation at all. However, this particular story—that people value having something others do not—is rarely if ever applied
in conventional economic models. In its defense, the story we tell here draws on the concept of “positional goods” proposed by
Hirsch (1978), and we note that there is empirical evidence of positional spending (Carlsson et al., 2007). Another explanation
for the same excess demand function is that consumers associate price with quality (Gabor and Granger, 1966), a phenomenon
which is, like positional consumption, problematic for conventional economics (Stiglitz, 1987). Moreover, consumers’ beliefs
are not always justified, because for many goods the relationship between price and quality is weak (Curry and Riesz, 1988;
Gerstner, 1985), so essentially the same good can be sold at a higher price if it is believed to be superior.
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Figure 2: Paths from one stable critical point to another
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